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Returning, however, to our main inquiry, we are not told by Professor Berman how the energy-influences are related to the body. In other words, nobody knows anything about the "energy-influences," "conative tendencies," "biological interests," "self-maintenance of system C," "*élan vital*," or whatever we choose to call it or them, so it is useless to discuss this part of the mind-body problem. Although I should prefer the vitalistic method of approach here, probably most of the readers of this JOURNAL would rather think of the primary biological interests as the result of the organization of simpler material elements. In the latter case the emergent theory fits in better than any of the older views. Incidentally I may call attention to the fact that, if one assumes that the biological interests emerge from the organization of material atoms, this apparently behavioristic or materialistic solution of the question does not lead in the direction of an ontological materialistic monism or any kind of monism, first, because, since so much is made of the result of *organization* and *integration*, the organizing or integrating agency is still to be accounted for; second, because no one knows what the first elements are with which the organization begins, electrons being simply our present stopping place; and third, because the whole view is pluralistic. What we have is a hierarchy of entities increasing in "value" with each new integration of the next lower processes. But in these philosophical problems I am not for the moment interested.

*Summarizing*, I believe it is helpful to keep in view that the word "mind" (in its wider meaning) includes three things: first, the primary biological interests: second, adaptive behavior (mind in its narrower meaning): third, consciousness. The classical solutions of the mind-body problem, parallelism, interactionism, double-aspect theory, epiphenomenalism, *etc.*, do not apply to any of these, although we know little about the first. The emergent theory seems better all around.

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## TWO NOTES ON ESTHETICS

THE discussion of esthetics in Vol. XIX, No. 5 of this JOURNAL raised two points which seem to invite further consideration. One is Mr. Pepper's "common-sense concept" for a working unit psychical or subjective side of experience may be the same as what we know indirectly from without as the potential energy of the nerve currents in the brain." (*Monist*, Vol. XVIII, p. 27.) I am myself unable to see why either the emergent theory of Dr. Alexander or the energy theory of Professor Montague needs to be supplemented by introducing any double-aspect view.

in esthetics; the other is the relation of beauty to utility, in part as related to that concept.

## I

Mr. Pepper's concept is first defined as "the *liking of a thing for itself* in contrast to the valuing of a thing as a means to something else," and a little further on as "things valued for themselves independent of all practical considerations." I am not sure that these two statements are wholly consistent; but that we can better decide later. The first element, the "liking of a thing for itself," corresponds pretty closely to the criterion of beauty in St. Thomas Aquinas: *Id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet*, already brought forward as a working conception in Mr. Carritt's *Theory of Beauty*, p. 9. It may be helpful to examine this phrase in its context, and in the light of some other passages in Aquinas, with a view to seeing their implications.

The phrase occurs in a discussion of the statement that "not only the good but also the beautiful is loved by every one," which runs as follows: "The beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in the way we conceive it (*ratione*). Since the good is that which all desire, it is of the nature of the good that in it desire finds rest. But it pertains to the nature of the beautiful that at the sight or knowledge of it perception (*apprehensio*) finds rest. Hence those senses especially consider beauty which are in closest touch with knowledge (*maxime cognoscitivi*), that is, sight and hearing, which serve the reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the objects of the other senses we do not use the name of beauty; for we do not speak of beautiful tastes or smells. Hence it is clear that the beautiful adds to the good a certain order with reference to the power of knowledge; so that we may call 'good' that which simply satisfies desire, and 'beautiful' that of which the very perception is pleasing" (*Summa*, 1a, 2ae, q. 27, art. 1; II, p. 224<sup>1</sup>). In another place the requisites of beauty are stated to be three: "First, wholeness or perfection; for things which are diminished are by that very fact ugly; second, due proportion, or consonance; and lastly, clarity; for which reason things which have a bright color are said to be beautiful" (*Summa*, 1a, 2ae, q. 39, art. 8). But the idea of proportion, as Aquinas was well aware, introduces an element of relation: "It must be said that beauty, health, and the like are spoken of with reference to something; for a certain tempering of the humors makes health in a youth as it does not in an old man; and there is a certain health in a lion which is death to a man. Hence health is a proportion of the

<sup>1</sup> References to volume and page are to the edition of Frette and Mare.

humors with reference to a certain nature. And so beauty consists in a proportion of members and colors" (*Comm. on Psalm XLIV; XVIII*, p. 504). Here Aquinas (like Bacon in his essay on beauty) is thinking mainly of personal human beauty; yet the remarks of both have an obvious extension to other ranges.

Thus we find in the context of our formula a good many qualifications. Beauty may involve an element of knowledge, as well as of purely emotional reaction; it may be apprehended under changing conditions, and these changes may alter our apprehension of it. In view of these considerations, can the formula carry us very far without being interpreted, and can it be interpreted without differences of opinion? Is the reliable perception of beauty that which we gain at first sight, or that which we arrive at only gradually? Or is the pleasure to be only that which we feel at the first moment? I take it that cases in which the beauty of something is by no means, or only very imperfectly, perceived at first sight are familiar enough to us all. And again, is every one's first perception of and pleasure in beauty of equal value? If so, we must probably reduce esthetic perceptions to the very simplest cases; if not, the door to divergence of opinion swings wide open again. "If these men would let the trimmings go," says Mr. Pepper, "they could coöperate and work in harmony." They could, perhaps, but would they? And they might not even agree with Mr. Pepper as to the real nature of "trimmings."

Meanwhile, it may be profitable to push our inquiry into Aquinas a little farther. It is clear that he recognizes a connection between the beautiful and the good, and the presence of an intellectual element in the former. Here is another passage bearing on the first point: "The beautiful and the good are indeed the same thing at bottom (*in subiecto*), because they are founded on the same thing, to wit, form, and on this account the good is praised as beautiful; but they differ in the way we think of them (*ratione*). The good properly has reference to desire; for the good is that which all things desire, and so it has the nature of an end; for desire is a certain motion toward a thing. But the beautiful has reference to the power of cognition, for those things are called beautiful which when seen are pleasing. Hence the beautiful consists in due proportion, because the senses are pleased by things that are duly proportioned, as by those that are like themselves; for sense is a certain *ratio*, and so is every power of cognition. And since cognition is effected by assimilation, and likeness has reference to form, the beautiful properly pertains to the nature of a formal cause" (*Summa*, 1a, 1ae, q. 5, art. 4; I, p. 38). Not only so, but the de-

sires for the beautiful and for the good are not really separate: "It must be said that the ending of desire in the good and the beautiful and peace is not an ending in different things. For by the very fact that anything desires the good, it desires at the same time the beautiful and peace; the beautiful, in so far as it is in itself modified and specified,<sup>2</sup> which is included in the nature of the good; but the good adds an order of perfecting to other things. Peace, again, imports the removal of perturbations and the gaining of what is sought. But the very fact of desiring means the desire to remove what stands in the way of it. Hence by the same desire we desire the good, the beautiful, and peace" (*De Veritate*, q. 22, art. 1; XV, p. 144).

So much, then, for the connection and the difference between goodness and beauty, as Aquinas conceived them; and if we discount the scholastic terminology, we shall find in his account (which is, of course, entirely incidental to his larger purpose) a good deal with which we may agree. For myself, I do not feel that beauty can be restricted to the emotional, but rather that an intellectual element is, or may be, present in it. The requisite of "wholeness or perfection" has perhaps some relation to Croce's contention that there are degrees of ugliness but not of beauty, and shows how that contention should be interpreted. The idea of beauty as in part arising from the relation to an observer or recipient is one which a sound esthetic can hardly leave out of account. Finally, in the correlation of beauty, goodness, and peace there is a reference to that feature of the esthetic experience which a too little known poet has called "the strange quietude of human art." These are points noted in passing; I am not trying to coördinate them, much less to work them into a systematic presentation.

What now are we to understand by Mr. Pepper's values "independent of all practical considerations"? Do they mean instrumental values in general, or are they to be more narrowly interpreted, in the sense of the strictly utilitarian? If the former, it can hardly be maintained that instrumental values can have no place in the esthetic experience; if the latter, we are led directly to the second point which I wish to discuss.

## II

The good old notion that utility is a self-evident concept, the applications of which are immediately clear, was a great labor-saver. Apply it to a given experience, note the elements it ex-

<sup>2</sup> "For the beautiful adds, over and above a good order with reference to the power of knowing, that the fact should be of a certain kind" (*Comm. on Dionysius*, c. IV, lect. 5; xxix, p. 443).

plains, and set down the remainder to such minor considerations as the esthetic. Nothing could in appearance be simpler, even if the result might be such cheerful flippancy as William James's coupling of psychiatry as the study of the harmful in mental life with esthetics as the study of the useless. Unfortunately, the notion of utility is both complex and highly relative; and we can not see either its various degrees or its applications to art without careful scrutiny.

In ordinary life, the criterion of utility is *specific application*; a thing is seen to be useful just in so far as it immediately meets a specific need. But the more specialized it becomes, the less adapted it is to any but its own special situation. A saw is useful only for a particular operation, and a keyhole saw only for a particular kind of sawing; and either is of "use" only when both desire and opportunity for sawing are present. But we should think it palpably absurd to call a good tool "useless" when it is merely unemployed, that is, in the absence of the situation to which it is adapted. Now the case is not radically altered when we turn to spiritual processes and capacities. It is true that the latter are not, and can not be, so directly fitted to immediate situations as are material tools; and there is, further, a greater need of specific response by the other factor in the situation. But the element of response is not wholly lacking even in the case of tools; it requires a certain type of saw to cut metal, or to cut wood to the best advantage, and a screwdriver is not very effective on an uncut screw-head. Thus it does not seem that there is a radical difference between the two groups of cases, but rather a difference of emphasis in common elements.

Looking now more carefully at the applications of utility, we can for convenience distinguish four major forms. First, there is that which has *immediate special* application, like a title-deed, which refers to a specific actual "here and now," and has no explicit reference to anything else. Secondly, there is that which has *mediate special* application, like a statute, which prescribes how a specific situation is to be dealt with *if* it occurs, but does not specify when or where it will occur, or even that it will necessarily occur at all. Thirdly, there is that which has *immediate general* application, like the multiplication table, adaptable to an indefinite number of situations, which must occur in *some* experience; but the kind and manner of the experience are not specified, beyond the presupposition of ability to figure correctly. And fourthly, there is that which has *mediate general* application, depending on adaptation to a specific response, which must be furnished in and by an individual experi-

ence. To this class belong, among others, religious rituals and works of art. To say that the response to the appeal of a work of art is "useless" because it does not lead to a concrete action seems to me misleading. Sometimes it does issue in action; often it may lead to a beneficial heightening of the perception of the meaning of experience. Nor is concrete action always, in the broader sense, "useful." The tendency of an individual to self-preservation need not be wholly useful even to him, and certainly need not be so to others; and the need of self-expression in an art may be so imperative that the satisfaction of it will be as useful to its possessor, in the sense of maintaining the equilibrium of his personality, as the satisfaction of any other personal need.

Obviously, as we go through the sequence of utilities thus roughly distinguished, the place of "utility" in the narrow sense of immediate and specific application grows smaller, and the place of other values, including the esthetic, grows larger. It is now important to notice that below the level of the simple utility is another level, that of the extemporized solution—the makeshift. This we may tolerate, as the best way out of gravely hampering conditions; but we do not admire it for itself, and as a constant reliance it betrays its user. The habitual use of makeshifts turns into shiftlessness. Just so, an action which, even skilfully, evades a real moral issue leaves us guarded or squeamish in our admiration, and certainly causes us no glow of satisfaction.

Let us say, then, that immediately recognized specific utility is the zero point on a scale of values. Below it is the region of makeshifts and patchwork; just above it is the region of devices which with some measure of skill meet a real need, or even any presented situation. Now, just as below the zero point any satisfaction which we feel is either misplaced or apologetic, so at the zero point we feel no distinguishable satisfaction, because both situation and solution pass immediately and without analysis into the general current of experience. But as we go up the scale, satisfaction rises into consciousness as a distinct element, and tends to be deepened and diversified. In watching any sort of "good job" we feel a pleasure which is not explained by any practical relation in which we stand to it—but which is not always impaired by such a relation, for we may feel the same sort of pleasure in connection with an activity of our own. What first makes this reaction possible is the fact that we can find leisure to stand off a little from the experience, and so appraise in it other values than the purely practical. Then, the higher in the scale we go, the wider is the circle of possible adaptations, the less crudely material the aim, so that the attitude of

purely esthetic contemplation grows correspondingly easier. But if we cut loose entirely from the original basis of the experience, or if we try to assume an attitude of detachment without anything from which to be detached, the desired esthetic reaction will be either falsified or demolished.

This conception of a scale of values in which utility and beauty are gradually distinguished, and the latter made more prominent than the former, enables us to see just where the fallacy of "independence of practical considerations" takes its rise. It is easy to argue that because the element grows less and less marked, a point may be reached at which it will vanish entirely, and a "pure" esthetic value remain; and such a view has often been held. I quote, for instance, the words of a writer noted for cautiousness of statement, who also has a sound view of the general nature of the esthetic experience: "All Fine Art, then, we may say, is founded originally in satisfied utility, and in some cases continues dependent on it to the last. It is conditioned by the utility out of which it arises, and with which it is contrasted. And thus, when we look at the Fine Arts in their full development, a distinction is plainly to be drawn between those which continue throughout to be conditioned upon the prior satisfaction of some specific non-artistic utility, and those which are cut loose from such specific dependence, and have a free self-centered existence of their own."<sup>3</sup> The doctrine of the first two sentences is absolutely sound; but that of the third introduces the fallacy. The practical consideration may be indefinitely attenuated, but it is never wholly lost; we no more encounter disembodied arts than we encounter disembodied human beings in ordinary life. Even in an observer the question of esthetic response can not be wholly divorced from considerations which may broadly be termed "practical"; still less so can it be if we consider the activity of the artist. The qualities of pigments or the nature of a plastered wall are of practical concern to the painter, the ranges and timbres of musical instruments to a composer, the associations of words to a poet, and so on indefinitely; and these form but a single range of such considerations. I doubt if a serious artist often sets to work in entire disregard of them; and it is certainly the case that artists who profess a lordly disdain of them generally come to grief.

I conclude, then, that Mr. Pepper's concept is at best a sign-post, which can only direct us toward a theory of valuation to be worked out on its own merits, with as much conflict of opinions as may be necessary. We may grant that "things valued for themselves"

<sup>3</sup> Shadworth Hodgson, *The Metaphysic of Experience*, III, p. 435.



exist, though I think we can do so only after careful definition; but even if we do, we may still hold that such values need not be self-evident, and ask under what conditions they are to be recognized. As for "independence of all practical considerations," that is a phrase too vague to be helpful unless interpreted; and if it be interpreted as making the esthetic attitude the polar antithesis of the practical, it seems to be setting up an unnecessary and untenable dualism. For my part, I believe that a better point of departure would be the conception of beauty not as something *aimed at by* an experience, but as something which *comes to be recognized in* an experience. If this is what Aquinas meant by calling it a formal, not a final, cause, he was profoundly right.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*Foundations of Formal Logic.* H. BRADFORD SMITH. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1922. 56 pp.

In this pamphlet, which is intended for use in the classroom, Mr. Smith treats some of the problems of logic from a very special angle, so that we can not leave the work without the question—are these the foundations of logic? Modern mathematical logic has so broadened the Aristotelian and Mediæval conceptions of the subject that we anticipate much more than a treatment of the syllogism in a paper which has the mathematical form; and yet Mr. Smith restricts himself to the syllogism, its moods and figures, with a few paragraphs on immediate inference. The exposition makes use of a quasi-mathematical symbolism which involves many of the ideas of more familiar logical calculuses, but the total impression is one of clumsiness and inelegance. Though the avowed purpose of such a symbolism is to add clarity, Mr. Smith's symbols confuse rather than illuminate: his system lacks the simplicity and completeness which we have been led to expect from mathematical logic.

We are able, however, to extract the following points from the paper: (1) Mr. Smith believes that the subject-matter of logic is a certain number of propositions about classes. "The problem of a deductive science," he tells us, "is to define its elements . . . by an enumeration of their formal properties. The task of logic is, then, to develop its own system by constructing all the true and all the untrue propositions into which its elements enter exclusively." These elements are, for Mr. Smith, classes. This is a debatable point since we have learned from Peano and Russell, from Couturat and